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Abstract—This paper describes materials developed to engage
professional developers in discussions about security. First, the
work is framed in the context of ethnographic studies of software
development, highlighting how the method is used to explore
and investigate research aims for the Motivating Jenny research
project. A description is given of a series of practitioner engage-
ments, that were used to develop a reflection and discussion tool
using security stories taken from media and internet sources.
An explanation is given for how the tool has been used to collect
data within field sites, offering a way to clarify and member check
findings, and to provide a different view on practice and process.
The report concludes with observations and notes about future
aims for supporting and encouraging professionals to engage with
security in practice.
Index Terms—secure software development, collaborative en-
vironments, empirical studies
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the availability of tools, accepted process models,
and the vast coverage of security incidents in the media, one
might expect that developers would adopt secure practices as a
matter of course [1]. Surprisingly, however, many professional
software developers do not consistently and comprehensively
make use of security tools, models and practices. Why is this?
It may be that writing secure code requires effort be made
by developers at every step in the development process.
However, it may be that security in software development is
also driven by intrinsic factors that can be supported through
social interactions in the community and culture of software
development.
Starting from this premise, the Motivating Jenny project1
is conducting a series of ethnographic studies that build upon
frameworks of personal motivation and team culture [2], [3].
The project aim is examining what security in practice is
like in the professional world, with the aim to find ways to
better support and engage developers with security [1]. The
workshop described in this report is one example of how this
project is meeting this aim, by developing a set of materials
that are being refined for dissemination to practitioners work-
ing in the field.
II. BACKGROUND
The ethnographic method is used to study peoples’ actions
and accounts of actions. The method allows researchers to de-
velop understanding about what practitioners working in socio-
technical environments do and why they do it [4]. Ethnog-
1https://www.motivatingjenny.org
raphy’s distinguishing feature is that it allows researchers to
consider experience from the perspective of the insider [5].
Motivating Jenny has an interest in understanding the point-of-
view professional software developers have about security. A
particular focus is given to ”ordinary organisational insiders”
[6], that is, to developers who are not specialists in security.
Ethnographic research often includes exploration of open
ended questions that are used to guide individual study designs
and to support interactions in the field. This paper opened with
one such problem, noting the discrepancy between existing
methods to secure software and adoption among practitioners,
asking:
Why don’t developers adopt secure practices and
technologies as a matter of course?
In engaging with questions like these, researchers are able
to develop and maintain a critical stance toward a topic
[5]. In studies for the Motivating Jenny project, this entails
listening to what developers say, but also considering how
what developers say might be shaped by their interactions with
the researchers, and with other aspects in their working envi-
ronment, including other developers, the workplace, within the
broader software development profession, and beyond.
The project seeks to understand how to motivate profes-
sional developers to engage with security in software engineer-
ing practice. The project does not intend to assess the quality
or quantity of the security information developers possess.
These two statements elide aspects inherent in conducting field
studies in professional settings.
First, it is necessary to establish trust and to engage
with professionals in a way that is non-judgmental. This is
particularly important in investigations that involve sensitive
concerns. In the same way that companies, and developers,
don’t want to be perceived as releasing buggy code [7], neither
wants to be perceived as releasing insecure code.
Related to this, it is often necessary to quickly get under
the skin of a topic during interactions in the field; access
to professionals is difficult to get and is often sporadic
or constrained [8]. In software engineering, this means it
can be challenging to get past the codified knowledge [9]
that professional developers are ”supposed” to know. In the
context of this research, early interactions confirmed that it
is difficult to establish what developers think about security.
In conversation, many developers are able to quickly name
common vulnerabilities or to describe in broad terms aspects
of threat modelling, but this doesn’t reveal very much about
their interest in security or how important they believe it is.
One way to explore a topic like security is to undertake
activities that run parallel to studies conducted in the field.
These activities provide opportunities to build up understand-
ing about the topic under investigation [10]. They also serve
as an additional, if informal source of information by which to
confirm or refute meanings collected in other data [8]. Finally,
they serve the practical purpose of raising fluency with the
topic, making it easier for researchers to conduct studies in
the field.
The workshop described in the following sections is an
example of an activity that can run in parallel to field studies,
and can be adapted for use with participants from field studies
or taken into professional settings for independent use.
III. DESIGN
The design for the workshop grew out of observations made
in early interactions with practitioners in a meetup2 and a
preliminary study of conversation in an on-line Q&A envi-
ronment [11]. It should be noted that the first interaction did
not include formal data collection; the second was conducted
with approval of the first author’s university ethics committee.
Through these activities, conversations among developers
about security were shown to include technical advice and
guidance that include established practices and principles.
They also include statements about personal values and at-
titudes like responsibility, trust, and fear. This point stood out:
similar attitudes have been shown to determine or influence
security behavior in the general public [12]. It seemed reason-
able to assume that they also influence developers, and that
finding ways to harness talk about values and attitudes might
be a way to positively influence secure coding behaviour.
A. Aims and Objectives
This workshop was developed as a part of research that
is examining the role motivation plays in the production of
secure code and how practitioners can initiate and sustain a
secure software culture. The workshop meets two needs for
the larger research program.
First, as noted above, the workshop supports and strengthens
our research activities in field sites [4]. It meets three research
aims:
1) It increases fluency with the topic, better equipping the
researchers to interact with developers in the field, and
to ”get under the skin” of security.
2) It provides a secondary source of information that can
be compared with evidence gathered in formal studies.
3) It is a way evaluate the project’s growing sense about
”what security is” against theories and conceptual frame-
works in fields other than software engineering.
Second, ethnography can be used to inform the design of
software engineering tools and improve process development
2https://www.meetup.com/Extreme-Programmers-
London/events/245075051/
[4]. Though Motivating Jenny is not specifically focused on
tools or process, one aim of the project is to develop guidelines
and materials that professional developers can use to engage
with security in practice. To this end, a series of objectives
were defined for the workshop structure and content.
1) Encourage attendees to primarily engage with each
other, in order to promote a more naturalistic environ-
ment, similar to those in which developers normally
work.
2) Provide an opportunity for attendees to engage with
scenarios drawn from actual security events.
3) Establish a space for non-confrontational interaction
about security.
B. Related Work
The following sections describe related work that informed
the workshop design.
1) Supporting interaction through talk: Unscheduled talk
in the workplace is integral to software development. Conver-
sations between developers include sharing war stories about
past experiences but also provide a narrative for one another
in the midst of practice, a ”summing up” [13] that workers use
to develop confidence, to circulate ”community memory” and
to learn [14]. Talk is used to generate understanding of what
the software is and needs to be, and of what developers need
and would like to make. This kind of ”code talk” is often
”snatched” or serendipitous, but lends structure to decisions
about work that will be undertaken at the desk [15].
2) Security events in the media: The public sphere has
been identified as one of the ways workers develop awareness
of security [16]. In the current climate, security incidents
are widely reported in media sources. It is also possible to
find accounts of developers who have been affected by high-
profile breaches. Like war stories [13], these personal accounts
provide insight into how developers solve security related
problems. They also give additional perspective about the
far reaching impact of security incidents on developers and
companies.
3) Taking a positive approach toward security: When de-
velopers talk about code, it is value laden and dynamic [15]. It
is also supportive. The approach used was influenced, in part,
by The Envisioning Cards, a set of cards and exercises de-
signed to help designers think broadly about how technologies
are used, and to consider their long-term effects on societies
[17]. In taking a positive, value-oriented approach toward
security [18], developers are permitted to identify what they
believe is important in their work, a point that has connections
with research in motivation [19]. The approach taken is to
position security as a quality to be striven for [20].
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WORKSHOP
Using recent tabletop security games [21], [22] as a guide,
materials were developed that would evoke a sense of play
and engage attendees [23]. The workshop is structured to last
90 minutes. Participants are divided into groups of 5 or 6 (see
group work in Figure 2). Activities are undertaken in three
parts:
Part 1 Compromised Software (30:00) In this part, attendees
read the report of the compromise given by HandBrake (read
an overview of the incident in Section IV-B). A set of cards
prompts discussion about different aspects of the security
incident (see Figure 1), including stakeholders and impact of
the incident.
Part 2 Another Point of View (30:00) In part two, each
group works through a second version of the HandBrake
incident. This version of the incident is an account told
from the perspective of a developer (See Figure 1) who was
directly affected by the compromise reported in part one.
Prompting questions aid discussion about how perceptions
about stakeholders and impact change when the focus of the
incident is oriented toward a developer.
Part 3 Group Discussion (30:00) In Part 3, groups are
brought together for facilitated discussion. Because this work-
shop is employed in different kinds of environments, the con-
tent of this section has been tailored to individual interactions.
A. Instructions
The instructions given for parts one and two are the same:
Open the envelope marked Part1/Part 2. Inside, you will
find a report of a security incident and a set of cards.
• Use 10 minutes to read the reports.
• Spend 15 minutes discussing the questions on the cards
in relation to this story.
• For the last 5 minutes, make a note about two or three
points that stood out in discussion. Include notes about
why each point stood out.
As you work through each part, take notes about key points
on sheets of paper or directly on the cards themselves (for
examples of notetaking, see Figures 3 and 4).
B. The Incident: HandBrake
In May 2017, attackers compromised a download server for
the open-source media-encoding software HandBrake. An in-
fected version of the software was placed on the compromised
server that included the malicious software Proton. Once in-
stalled on Mac computers, Proton allows unauthorized access
to the affected machine 3. Reports were collected about this
incident from general news websites, technical news websites,
news aggregators, and the notice of the compromise posted by
the software company4. An account of a software developer
working at Panic Software who infected his computer with
the compromised software5 was also collected to provide a
perspective on the story to which participants could more






FIRST SET OF VALUES, ADAPTED FROM [24]
Value Description
Trust Expectations and confidence in the reliability ofsocial interactions with others, for example, good will.
Privacy Right of an individual to determine what informationbe communicated to others.
Autonomy The ability to act in ways that will help oneachieve goals.
Ownership A right to possess information, use it, manage it,& bequeath it.
Human Welfare Physical, material and psychological well-being.
Fairness Impartial and just treatment or without favouritismor discrimination.
Accessible Ensuring all people are able to accessinformation technology.
Informed Consent Permission for something to happen,granted in full knowledge of the possible consequences.
Accountable
Properties ensuring that actions of a person, people or
institution are able to be uniquely traced,
explained or understood.
Identity A persons understanding of who he or she is over time,embracing continuity and discontinuity.
C. Value Cards
Part two includes prompting cards and also a set of cards
that name a series of values with suggested definitions. The
prompting cards ask attendees to consider the perspective of
the developer affected by the compromise in light of the
values.
Two sets of values have been adapted and trialled, including
one set drawn from value-centred design (See Table I) and one
from social psychology (See Table II).
V. DISCUSSION
The workshop has been run with slight variations three
times. This section gives a synopsis of each event, with notes
about variations.
A. Summer 2018: Practitioner Conference
The workshop was first given in a 75 minute session at a
practitioner conference in London, UK. Attended by between
30 and 35 people, goals for this event were to trial the work
shop design, and to define the security dimensions. Due to
constraints in the room, attendees worked in groups of between
6 and 8 people.
Each group was given a report from different media sources
for Part 1. Each account reported basic details about the inci-
dent, but provided different kinds of background information
and different commentary. In Part 2, each group was given the
same account of the compromise at Panic software. The first
set of values was used to support discussion for this part (See
Table I).
Part 3 was used to talk over a story about a security incident
told by a participant in the group. Other participants were
Fig. 1. Stories and Cards
Fig. 2. Group Work
invited to use a prompting question or a value card from Part
One or Part Two within the discussion.
In running the session, the materials and instructions worked
well, however there was not enough time in the schedule to
permit a full discussion in part 3. In spite of this, written
feedback provided to conference organisers after the event was
overwhelmingly positive. 17 attendees provided conference
organisers with written feedback after the session. Ranked
along a scale with five indicating an Excellent session, all
respondents found the session to be either a 4 or 5. Likewise,
feedback indicated that the respondents felt that they learned
a lot, and that the session was well led, a point we to took as
affirmation that the design of the workshop was effective.
Here are some positive comments from the feedback:
Great team discussion!
Fig. 3. Notes on cards
Fig. 4. Notes from a session
TABLE II
SECOND SET OF VALUES, ADAPTED FROM [25]
Value Description
Self-direction Freedom to cultivate ones own ideas and abilities.Freedom to determine ones own actions.
Safety Safety in ones immediate environment.Safety and stability in the wider society.
Conformity Compliance with rules, laws and formal obligations.Avoidance of upsetting or harming other people.
Benevolence Being a reliable and trustworthy member of the group.Devotion to the welfare of group members.
Universalism Commitment to equality, justice and protection for all.Acceptance and understanding of differences in people.
Power Exercising control over people.Control of material and social resources.
Stimulation Excitement, novelty and change.
Achievement Success according to social standards.
Tradition Maintaining and preserving cultural traditions.
Humility Recognising ones insignificance in the larger scheme.
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification.
Face Maintaining ones public image and avoiding humiliation.
I liked the way the two parts were from different
perspectives.
A refreshingly different look at security issues in
software.
Really enjoyable, thought provoking and
participatory! Thank you!
The feedback also included critical comments. Several at-
tendees noted that the session was too short to allow for
comprehensive group discussion. One person noted that how
the value cards were to be used was not clear. We used these
points to refine the second and third events.
B. Autumn 2018: Field Site
With this workshop, the primary aim was to observe how
the participants from one project field site interact with one
another when talking about security. Prior observations of
group work had taken place during everyday practice in a
large open plan office. Though a few instances of practice were
observed that included security elements, this was the first time
developers at this company were observed openly conversing
about security. This session was also used to clarify findings
generated in earlier visits, and to elicit further comments about
the attendees’ experiences and attitudes.
The workshop was attended by 6 developers, one tester that
had been interviewed and one developer new to the company.
The attendees worked in groups of four. The second set of
values was used (See Table II). In Part 3, a group discussion
was facilitated. The questions for Part 3 are given below:
1) Is talking about security incidents in this way helpful?
• What did you like?
• What didn’t make sense?
• Are there other approaches you have used that were
helpful?
• How were they like or different than this exercise?
2) Does a consideration of stakeholders, and impact come
into software development at this company? How often,
what prompts it?
3) How about a consideration of values in the context of
security? Does it come up? When?
4) Can you think of recent examples from your experience
at this company where similar kinds of talk have taken
place?
• If so, where was that? What context, e.g. a meeting
or in the kitchen?
5) Could an approach like this be used at this company if
so where, how?
6) Who is responsible for security in code?
• What role do/can developers play in this?
As in the first session, attendees at this field site were en-
gaged and focused in the activities for the workshop. Feedback
gathered in the third part has not been fully analyzed, however,
the response to the first question, Is talking about security
incidents in this way helpful? was a pronounced ”Yes.”
C. Autumn 2018: Seminar form
For this invited 6o minute talk, the workshop was presented
to a room in which participants were sitting in groups of two
or three at small tables. Approximately 30 people attended.
In this environment, the second set of values was used (See
Table II). Each table was given a random selection of three or
four value cards from the set of 12.
Drawing on elements of the case-based [26] and peer
instruction [27] teaching methods, the accounts of the software
compromise were presented to the room as a case. After
presenting the incident, attendees were asked to give a show
of hands for these questions:
• Is this incident unusual?
• Is it likely to happen again?
Following this, attendees were asked to discuss with each
other who might be affected by a compromise of this type.
Impressions were shared afterward around the room. After pre-
senting the developer-centred version of the incident, attendees
were asked to discuss with their partners how the values they
found on their table figured into the case.
After a period of five minutes, attendees were asked to
volunteer information for the following questions:
• Which of the values from the table was the most impor-
tant? For whom?
• When did this value come to the fore? Before the incident,
after, or long after?
For the third part of the discussion, the session leaders
facilitated a brief discussion around the room around the
following two points:
• Security should be handled through tooling.
• Developers should be thinking about security all the time.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED
It has been suggested that developers need to be taught
new attitudes toward security that will encompass technical
knowledge and security analysis, but also skills in communi-
cating about security issues beyond engineering teams. What
is needed are ”engaging” interventions that will appeal to
programmers [28].
Experiences to date with this workshop suggest that a pos-
itive approach that connects security to developer experiences
is useful in engaging professionals in discussion, but there are
some areas that can be improved.
A. Developers engage with personal stories.
Talking around two perspectives for a single security in-
cident is an effective way to strike a balance in discussion
between technical and security detail, and personal values.
The ”Panic” story is close enough to the developers’ own
experience to engage them, but not close enough to inhibit
participation. The workshop has been using reports printed
in full from the internet. While this worked in the first two
sessions, we have now gathered enough information about how
developers engage with these sources to refine the stories into
shorter cases.
B. Interaction through play is effective.
Participants enjoy the physical aspects of the game, includ-
ing setting the timers and working with cards. Though the
sets of prompting cards have been effective in the workshops,
informal feedback suggests that there are too many questions
for each section. Likewise, asking only two or three questions
per section worked well in the seminar. Going forward, the
sets of questions for each part will be refined and streamlined.
C. Values support conversation.
Informal feedback suggests that developers like taking a
positive, value-oriented approach toward security. Two sets
of values drawn from different fields of research have been
trialled. The workshops in which the individual sets were used
were similar in character; attendees did not appear to have
difficulty in talking about the values in either set. However, it
is not clear exactly what role the values play in the process,
particularly in relation to the incident that was used. Formal
evaluation of the workshop must be made to clarify these
points.
D. Public incidents facilitate information trading.
Informal observation suggests that different kinds of infor-
mation are traded among developers in the midst of these
conversations. Developers were observed to expand on tech-
nical information included in the reports, providing additional
scenarios and examples from personal experience, but also
drawing in terminology associated with the security mindset
including threats, attacks and technology specific security
facts. Fuller analysis of the workshop data gathered in the
field site to catalog information trading is underway.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The question of why professionals don’t adopt secure prac-
tices and technologies as a matter of course remains open, and
is a part of continuing investigations in the Motivating Jenny
project. However, with this workshop, the project has identified
ways to support professionals in talking about security.
The workshop developed here includes a set of working
materials that can be employed with practitioners in a variety
of settings. It uses narrative and storytelling to connect de-
velopers with security incidents, and to encourage talk about
security implications and impacts.
These activities have a place in professional settings. In
structuring activities around an incident taken from the public
sphere, professionals are shown techniques for critical engage-
ment with sources that are known to influence security aware-
ness. The non-confrontational space for talk about security
stands to positively affect security problem solving, confidence
and knowledge.
Looking forward, the materials will continue to be used
and developed within the project to support interactions with
developers in field sites and community engagements. Several
additional research and practical aims have been identified:
• Investigate in more detail what values bring to talk within
security discussions. The set depicted in Table II will
be explored in more detail, as they more closely reflect
qualities related to software developer characteristics and
motivation.
• Conduct a formal evaluation of the materials. This will
begin with a structured examination of feedback given
from the first engagement, and an analysis of workshop
data gathered as a part of the field study.
• Develop the materials into a set of cards for production
and dissemination.
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